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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Rear Admiral Seán F. Crean—Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the 
Navy. Mr. Crean serves as Chief Advisor to the Secretary on all small business matters. He is 
responsible for small business acquisition policy and strategic initiatives.  
Mr. Crean joined the Secretary of the Navy Staff as a member of the Senior Executive Service in 
January 2010 and has over 30 years of federal service. Prior to receiving this appointment, he served 
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Logistics Management during a two-
year military recall to active duty as a Rear Admiral in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Mr. Crean’s previous experience includes serving as the senior procurement analyst for the U.S. 
Small Business Administration’s Office of Government Contracting Area I (New England) for 19 
years. In this role he was the principal advisor to the SBA’s six regional district offices and 
congressional delegations on procurement issues. He provided acquisition strategy analysis for over 
20 buying activities throughout the region, supporting both DoD and Civilian federal agencies. He first 
entered federal civilian service as the Deputy Supply Officer for Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME, 
where he was also appointed the activity small business specialist. 
Mr. Crean’s combined military and civil service careers have provided complimentary and extensive 
leadership responsibilities in service to the country. As a member of the reserve component, he has 
attained the grade of Rear Admiral (two-star) and is currently assigned as Deputy Commander, Naval 
Supply Systems Command. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in business management and 
marine transportation from State University of New York Maritime College and a Master of Business 
Administration degree from New Hampshire College’s graduate school of business. 
He has a number of personal and command decorations, including two Legion of Merit awards. He is 
a member of the Defense Acquisition Corps and is DAWIA Level III Contracting certified. 
David Lamm—Professor Emeritus, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSBPP), NPS. 
Dr. Lamm served at NPS as both a military and civilian professor from 1978 through his retirement in 
January 2004, teaching a number of acquisition and contracting courses, as well as advising thesis 
and MBA project students. During his tenure, he served as the Academic Associate for the 
Acquisition & Contracting Management (815) MBA Curriculum, the Systems Acquisition Management 
(816) MBA Curriculum, the Master of Science in Contract Management (835) distance learning 
degree, and the Master of Science in Program Management (836) distance-learning degree. He 
created the latter three programs. He also created the International Defense Acquisition Resources 
Management (IDARM) program for the civilian acquisition workforce throughout the country. Finally, 
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in collaboration with the GSBPP Acquisition Chair, he established and served as PI for the Acquisition 
Research Program, including inauguration of an annual Acquisition Research Symposium. He also 
developed the Master of Science in Procurement & Contracting degree program at St. Mary’s College 
in Moraga, CA, and served as a Professor in both the St. Mary’s and The George Washington 
University’s graduate programs. 
He has researched and published numerous articles as well as written an acquisition text entitled 
Contract Negotiation Cases: Government and Industry (1993). He served on the editorial board for 
the National Contract Management Journal and was a founding member of the editorial board for the 
Acquisition Review Quarterly, now known as the Defense Acquisition Review Journal. He served as 
the NPS member of the Defense Acquisition Research Element (DARE) from 1983–1990. 
Prior to NPS, he served as the Supply Officer aboard the USS Virgo (AE-30) and the USS Hector 
(AR-7). He also had acquisition tours of duty at the Defense Logistics Agency in Contract 
Administration and the Naval Air Systems Command, where he was the Deputy Director of the 
Missile Procurement Division. 
He holds a BA from the University of Minnesota and an MBA and DBA both from The George 
Washington University. He is Fellow of the National Contract Management Association and received 
that association’s Charles A. Dana Distinguished Service Award and the Blanche Witte Award for 
Contracting Excellence. He created the NCMA’s Certified Professional Contracts Manager (CPCM) 
Examination Board and served as its Director from 1975–1990. He is the 1988 NPS winner of the 
RADM John J. Schieffelin Award for Teaching Excellence.
 =
=




Implementation of the Department of Defense Small Business 
Innovation Research Commercialization Pilot Program: Be All 
You Can Be? 
Max Kidalov—Assistant Professor, Procurement Law & Policy, NPS, and Member, Small 
Business Advisory Council, U.S. Department of Energy.  Mr. Kidalov graduated with a BS (cum 
laude) and JD from the University of South Carolina. For over three years during his prior service as 
Counsel for Procurement, Innovation, and Oversight Matters at the U.S. Senate Committee on Small 
Business & Entrepreneurship, then chaired by Senator Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME), Mr. Kidalov’s 
responsibilities included oversight of federal small business contracting and subcontracting programs, 
as well as oversight of U.S. international trade agreements related to government procurement that 
affected small businesses.  He also was a law clerk to the Honorable Loren A. Smith, formerly chief 




In Section 252 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2006, Congress 
adopted four wide-ranging reforms to the Department of Defense Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) 
programs in order to increase the effectiveness of SBIR and STTR for both the DoD 
and the defense industry. First, Section 252 directed closer alignment between R&D 
and acquisition goals of SBIR and STTR.  Second, Section 252 authorized and 
funded creation by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military Services of the 
Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP) to facilitate transition of SBIR technologies 
into the acquisition process.  Congress conditioned the use of CPP funds on detailed 
evaluative reporting to Congress.  Third, Congress codified into statutory law 
President George W. Bush’s Executive Order No. 13329, which incentivized 
manufacturing technologies through the SBIR and STTR programs.  Fourth, 
Congress clarified the authority to conduct testing and evaluation of SBIR and STTR 
technologies in SBIR and STTR Phases II and III.  The implementation requirements 
were specified in the text of Section 252 and the Congressional Guidance Letter 
issued by the House and the Senate Small Business Committees. 
This study analyzes the implementation of Section 252 by the Secretaries of 
Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.  It reflects the results of literature 
review and a survey of SBIR and STTR program executives.  The study questions 
are based on Section 252 text and the Congressional Guidance Letter, as well as on 
best practices identified in relevant academic and professional literature. The study 
finds that although the DoD and the military departments have begun implementation 
of the DoD SBIR CPP program and other Section 252 reforms, progress is uneven.  
Specifically, agencies are not implementing Section 252 CPP incentives and R&D 
alignment requirements to the fullest extent possible.  The study recommends 









The U.S. Department of Defense spends close to $1.5 billion a year on competitive 
R&D set-asides under the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and the Small 
Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, established under 15 U.S.C. § 638.  
These competitive set-asides are designed to help small firms investigate ideas for new 
technologies (Phase I) and develop prototypes (Phase II).  Congress intended that new 
technologies will be commercialized either through the federal procurement process or in 
private markets.  To encourage return on SBIR and STTR investment, Congress directed 
federal agencies to purchase products and services developed through SBIR and STTR to 
the maximum extent practicable, and authorized government agencies to buy SBIR and 
STTR technologies from SBIR and STTR awardees (or their successor firms) on a sole-
source basis.  In recent years, however, both Congress and industry have grown 
increasingly frustrated with the low utilization of SBIR and STTR-developed technologies in 
DoD acquisition, especially in major defense acquisition programs. 
In Section 252 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2006, “Research 
and Developments Efforts for Purposes of Small Business Research,” Congress adopted 
four wide-ranging reforms to the DoD SBIR and STTR programs in order to increase the 
effectiveness of SBIR and STTR for both the DoD and the defense industry. First, Section 
252 directed closer alignment between R&D and acquisition goals of SBIR and STTR.  
Second, Section 252 authorized and funded creation by the DoD and the military Services of 
the Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP) to facilitate transition of SBIR technologies into 
the acquisition process.  Congress conditioned the use of CPP funds on detailed evaluative 
reporting to Congress.  Third, Congress codified into statutory law President George W. 
Bush’s Executive Order No. 13329, Encouraging Innovation in Manufacturing, which 
incentivized manufacturing technologies through the SBIR and STTR programs.  Fourth, 
Congress clarified the authority to conduct testing and evaluation of SBIR and STTR 
technologies in SBIR and STTR Phases II and III.  The implementation requirements were 
specified in the text of Section 252 and the Congressional Guidance Letter, issued by the 
House and the Senate Small Business Committees. 
This paper analyzes the implementation of Section 252 by the Secretaries of 
Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.  It reflects the results of literature review 
and a survey of SBIR and STTR program executives  The study questions are based on 
Section 252 text and the Congressional Guidance Letter.  Study questions also rely on best 
practices identified in relevant academic and professional literature, in innovation programs 
of other federal agencies such as NASA, and in practices of our NATO partners such as the 
United Kingdom and France. The study finds that while the DoD and the military 
departments have begun implementation of the DoD SBIR CPP program and other Section 
252 reforms, progress is uneven.  Specifically, agencies are not implementing section 252 
CPP incentives and R&D alignment requirements to the fullest extent possible.  The study 
recommends clarifications of legislative requirements and additional review of Section 252 
implementation. 
The following section, Background of the SBIR and STTR Programs, gives general 
background information about SBIR and STTR. The section describes the programs 
objectives. It also describes firms’ eligibility requirements to participate in the each program. 
A list of participating government agencies is also in this section. A description of each of 
the three phases for the programs is given at the end of this section.  
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Next, the section titled Background of FY06 NDAA Section 252 delves into specific 
background of Section 252, including details from National Academies Symposium, SBIR 
and the Phase III Challenge of Commercialization. Following that symposium, “the Senate 
Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship proposed legislation that called for a 
commercialization pilot program” (NAS, 2005, p. 29, footnote 23). The purpose of this 
section is to give the reader an idea of the SBIR and STTR program conditions prior to 
Section 252 by putting it in context. After reading this section, the reader should understand 
the reasons why Congress adopted Section 252. 
A survey was conducted, directed primarily at SBIR and STTR program managers 
and administrators within DoD agencies and military Services, that attempted to ascertain 
how Section 252 has been carried out within these specific agencies. The Survey 
Methodology section describes in detail the methods we used. This section clearly states 
the survey questions that were given to participants. This section also describes limitations 
identified by the survey administrators. 
The analysis section the paper describes results from this survey. All of the 
respondents’ answers for each question are analyzed and compared with the Section 252 
legislation, the Congressional Guidance Letter, as well as with additional sources. The 
survey answers, in many cases, showed inconsistencies with the intent of the legislation as 
well as with announced practices. 
Finally, the paper concludes with answers to the research questions and the authors’ 
recommendations. 
Background of the SBIR and STTR Programs 
The DoD SBIR program awards contracts to qualifying small businesses that display 
the promise of producing cutting-edge technology for military or dual-use applications.  The 
technology may show promise, but that technology may still be too risky for private 
investment due to various reasons such as a relatively low technological readiness level and 
no past performance history for the company (Wessner, 2007). Therefore, an SBIR contract 
can act as initial funding to get what amounts to an idea developed into a product or service. 
The SBIR program began pursuant to the Small Business Innovation Act of 1982. The STTR 
program began pursuant to the Small Business Technology Transfer Act of 1992. SBIR and 
STTR have no permanent reauthorization, but have been periodically reauthorized since 
then. The main difference between SBIR and STTR is that SBIR contracts are open solely 
to small businesses, defined as businesses with less than 500 employees, and STTR 
contracts are open to small businesses that collaborate with not-for-profit research 
organizations such as universities and federally funded research and development centers 
(“SBIR and STTR Policy Directives,” 2002a, 2002b). 
As stated in the Small Business Innovation Act (1982), the SBIR and STTR 
programs have four goals:  
1. to stimulate technological innovation; 
2. to use small business to meet federal and development needs;  
3. foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in 
technological innovation; and  
4. to increase private sector commercialization derived from federal research 
and development. (p. 1) 
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The forth objective, commercialization, is defined by the U.S. Small Business 
Administration as “the process of developing marketable products or services and producing 
and delivering products or services for sale (whether by the originating party or by others) to 
Government or commercial markets” (“SBIR and STTR Policy Directives,” 2002a). 
Federal agencies with extramural R&D budgets of at least $100 million are required 
to participate in SBIR.  Federal agencies with extramural R&D budgets of at $1 billion are 
required to participate in STTR.  Participating agencies are required to set aside 2.5% and 
0.3% of their R&D budgets for SBIR and STTR programs, respectively.1  Within the DoD, 
each military department as well as the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) administer their own SBIR/STTR 
programs.  Seven agencies under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) administer 
the SBIR programs, but not STTR, including the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the 
Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA), the Defense Technical Information Center 
(DTIC), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Chemical and Biological 
Defense Program (CBDP), the Special Operations Acquisitions and Logistics Center 
(SOALC), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). 
The DoD SBIR/STTR awards processes are divided into three phases.  In Phase I, 
small businesses compete on SBIR/STTR topics that are published by the DoD.  The DoD 
announces SBIR topics three times a year and STTR topics twice a year.  Small businesses 
that earn Phase I contracts can generally be awarded up to $150,0002 while participating in 
SBIR and up to $100,000 while participating in STTR (“SBIR and STTR Policy Directives,” 
2002b). The purpose of Phase I is “for determining, insofar as possible, the scientific and 
technical merit and feasibility of ideas that appear to have commercial potential, as 
described in subparagraph (B), submitted pursuant to SBIR program solicitations.”3  Phase I 
awardees can be awarded up to $1 million for SBIR and $750,000 for STTR in a Phase II 
contract. The purpose of Phase II is “to further develop proposed ideas to meet particular 
program needs, in which awards shall be made based on the scientific, technical, and 
commercial merit and feasibility of the idea, as evidenced by the first phase and by other 
relevant information.”4 
Phase III is considered the commercialization phase. This is the step in which only 
non-SBIR/STTR funds, typically from private-sector investment or defense acquisition funds 
can be used to develop an actual product or service. In some cases, enough work can be 
completed in Phase I or II to satisfy a program office.  
Phase III refers to work that derives from, extends, or logically concludes effort(s) 
performed under prior SBIR funding agreements, but is funded by sources other 
than the SBIR Program. Phase III work is typically oriented towards 
commercialization of SBIR research or technology” . . . but may also include 
continuation of R&D.  “Phase III work may be for products, production, services, 
R/ R&D, or any combination thereof.”  “For Phase III, Congress intends that 
agencies or their Government-owned, contractor-operated facilities, Federally-
funded research and development centers, or Government prime contractors that 
                                                
1 The Statute is 15 U.S.C. 638. 
2 Federal Register, Volume 75, page 15,756. 
3 U.S.C., Title 15, 638. 
4 U.S.C., Title 15, 638. 
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pursue R/R&D or production developed under the SBIR Program, give 
preference, including sole source awards, to the awardee that developed the 
technology. In fact, the Act requires reporting to SBA of all instances in which an 
agency pursues research, development, or production of a technology developed 
by an SBIR awardee, with a concern other than the one that developed the SBIR 
technology.” “This notification must include, at a minimum: (a) The reasons why 
the follow-on funding agreement with the SBIR awardee is not practicable; (b) the 
identity of the entity with which the agency intends to make an award to perform 
research, development, or production; and (c) a description of the type of funding 
award under which the research, development, or production will be obtained.” 
SBA may appeal that decision.   Other cases, SBIR/STTR projects cannot cross 
the funding “valley of death” between Phase II and commercialization. (NAS, 
2005, pp. 5–6)  
Background of FY06 NDAA Section 252 
The purpose of Section 252 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2006 was 
to reform SBIR and STTR. Section 252 mostly addresses issues within the SBIR program, 
but does refer to STTR. The reason why the Congressional and Senate Small Business 
Committees are concerned with the state of SBIR and STTR is they believe that leveraging 
the innovation of small businesses is vital for the U.S.’s national security.  They also view 
Phase I and Phase II contract awards as investments of taxpayer dollars. Attempting to 
reform SBIR and STTR Section 252 added the following subsections to Section 9 of the 
Small Business Act: (x) Research and Development Focus; (y) Commercialization Pilot 
Program, language concerning Implementation of Executive Order No. 13329; and 
subsection (e)(9) language supporting testing and evaluation of SBIR and STTR 
technologies.  Each of these subsections is meant to address challenges that have been 
identified within the SBIR and STTR communities by the National Academies Symposium on 
SBIR commercialization and other inputs from government and industry.  These challenges 
include SBIR and STTR topic alignment, expediting the commercialization of SBIR and 
STTR projects and assurance that Executive Order No. 13329 is being implemented. 
Reform 1: SBIR Topics Generation 
Subsection (x) Research and Development Focus mandates that the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) will engage in a Quadrennial SBIR/STTR Review in order to revise and 
update the criteria and procedures utilized to identify research and development efforts that 
are suitable for SBIR and STTR programs at least once every four years. According to the 
Congressional Guidance Letter, subsection (x) “addresses the need for a strategic, DoD-
wide review of the SBIR and STTR program (conducted not less than quadrennially) based 
on the latest research, science, and technology plans of the DoD,” and based on the Joint 
Warfighting Science and Technology Plan, the Defense Technology Area Plan, and the 
Basic Research Plan. Each of these plans has a specific emphasis: joint warfighter 
operations, DoD-wide acquisition program priorities, and strategically 
disruptive/revolutionary technologies.  Together, these plans were to focus research and 
development efforts within the DoD SBIR and STTR to specific areas previously identified of 
strategic importance to warfighting efforts. At the same time, subsection (x) also mandates 
that program managers and program executive officers be included during topic generation. 
If an SBIR/STTR project is not aligned with an acquisition program to fill in technological 
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gaps, then it is unlikely to attract those kinds of funds.  Therefore, early involvement from 
program offices is essential. 
Reform 2: Commercialization Pilot Program 
Next, subsection (y) authorizes the Secretary of Defense and each military 
department secretary to create a Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP).  The CPP’s stated 
intent is to “accelerate the transition of SBIR technologies into Phase III including acquisition 
process.”  If a department decides to create a CPP, then the department must adhere to all 
the requirements within subsection (y).  These requirements include that the SECDEF and 
the secretary of each military department must identify SBIR projects that show potential for 
rapid transition into Phase III and certify in writing that the identified projects will meet high 
priorities within that military Service.  Each military department is authorized to use up to 1% 
of available SBIR funds to administer the CPP, but cannot be used to award Phase III 
contracts.  Subsection (y) also mandates that the SECDEF must provide an evaluative 
report to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
on Small Business of the House of Representatives.  This report must contain an accounting 
of funds, description of incentives and activities performed under the CPP, and results 
achieved under the CPP. 
The origin of the CPP came from the 2005 National Academies SBIR Transition 
Symposium.  This symposium was a gathering of leadership from government agencies, 
large defense contractors (prime contractors), and small businesses.  During the 
symposium, representatives from each discussed challenges of commercialization from their 
own point of view.  Policy reform recommendations at the symposium generally fell within 
two categories: (1) “possible changes in agency program management, including better use 
of incentives for managers, roadmaps, and greater matchmaking, and (2) ways in which 
small businesses and the prime contractors could better align their work to improve Phase III 
outcomes” (NAS, 2005, p. 23). 
While focusing on the “incentives for better management” the intent was to 
incentivize program managers and program executive officers to introduce new technologies 
that can result not only in substantial time, cost, or performance benefits, but also can 
present some risk of disruption to program costs and schedules if the technologies failed. 
Leading government officials, industry executive, and policy experts proposed various 
incentives for better SBIR program management.  For example, incentives were proposed in 
the following areas: 
 Alignment. Entering the SBIR company into a program with which the 
program executive officer was already engaged is one way to better focus 
SBIR projects on outcomes that directly support agency programs (and 
program officer) objectives. As noted by some speakers, this could allow 
SBIR projects to connect with Phase III activities already under way. 
 Reliability. This involves identifying technologies that have been 
operationally tested and need little if any modification. This suggestion by a 
participant reflected widely held views that program executive officer 
involvement was critical in bringing SBIR technologies to the necessary 
readiness level. 
 Capacity. As Dr. Michael McGrath, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation, noted, SBIR firms need 
to take steps to convince program executive officers not only that the SBIR 
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technology works, but also that the small business will be able to produce it to 
scale and on time. 
 Budget Integration. Some participants noted that program executive officers 
needed to see that the SBIR set-aside will be used to further their own 
missions. This calls for building SBIR research into the work and budget of 
program offices. By contrast, the Air Force’s program offices submit a budget 
based on independent cost estimates. SBIR awards are then taken as a 2.5% 
tax out of that budget.  
 Training. Major Stephen noted that training program executive officers to 
help them understand how SBIR can be leveraged to realize their mission 
goals is necessary. However, Mr. Carroll of Innovative Defense Strategies 
noted that SBIR training had been part of the general program executive 
officer training curriculum for one year, but had since been deleted. 
 Partnering. As described by Carl Ray, the SBIR program at NASA is forming 
partnerships with mission directorates aimed at enhancing “spinin” — the 
take-up of SBIR technologies by NASA programs. 
 Emphasizing Opportunity. Dr. McGrath noted that the Navy’s SBIR 
management attempts to provide a consistent message to program executive 
officers and program managers—that “SBIR provides money and opportunity 
to fill R&D gaps in the program. Apply that money and innovation to your 
most urgent needs.” (NAS, 2005, pp. 23–24) 
With respect to the roadmaps, “some participants emphasized the need to 
coordinate small business activities with prime contractor project roadmaps.” This is due to 
the complexities involved in integrating subsystems that are SBIR candidates into large 
weapon systems that prime contractors act as lead integrators. 
Lockheed’s Mr. Ramirez noted that “to make successful transitions to Phase III, 
SBIR technologies must be integrated into an overall roadmap.” Lockheed Martin 
uses a variety of roadmaps to that end, including both technical capability 
roadmaps and corporate technology roadmaps. The Raytheon representative 
added that roadmaps are important because it is necessary to coordinate the 
technology transition process across the customer, the supply chain, and small 
businesses. Coordination should include advanced technology demonstrations, 
which could be used to integrate multiple technologies into a complex system. 
(NAS, 2005, pp. 24–25) 
Ultimately, all symposium participants agreed that the transition to commercialization 
needed to be reformed. SBIR technologies need buy-in from program managers and prime 
contractors, and the attitude of SBIR being a “tax” on acquisition and R&D programs funding 
needed to change.  Statements at the NAS Symposium provided examples of incentive 
strategies needed to effect such a change.  Mr. Robert McNamara of the Navy, Program 
Executive Officer for PEO Submarines, described himself as an advocate of small business 
and said that the centerpiece of his advocacy was the SBIR program. In his Requests for 
Proposals (RFPs), he incentivizes primes to subcontract certain percentages of the work to 
small business. 
For example, he contracted with General Dynamics on the Virginia-Class Program, 
demonstrating that small businesses are a high priority, and offered a million-dollar “bounty” 
per hull as an additional incentive fee for contractors who met small business subcontracting 
goals. The Navy owes it to the large prime contractors, he said, to provide real incentives for 
a policy considered truly important (NAS, 2005, p. 142). 
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Col. Stephen, U.S. Air Force, suggested that in order to gain buy-in, the program 
should be sure to focus not only on research but also on the results that program managers 
need—outputs that directly support agency objectives. Dr. Parmentola agreed, saying that 
program managers want technologies that have been operationally tested and require little, 
if any, modification. Section 252 makes provisions for testing and evaluation.  Opening the 
SBIR program to test and evaluation is an incentive for PMs because results from T&E may 
be used to gauge the TRL of a SBIR project.  As stated by participants, the TRL is more 
important to PMs than ongoing research. 
This need for meaningful incentives was also reiterated by prime contractors.  Prime 
contractors represented at the conference stated that they have focused management 
attention, shifted resources, and assigned responsibilities within their own management 
structures to capitalize on the creativity of SBIR firms and promote greater testing and 
evaluation (NAS, 2005, p. 28). Lockheed Martin also intended to build more formal business 
relationships with its small businesses, which are critical to successful Phase III transitions. 
This process must begin with joint visits to customers, when both sides can discuss product 
discriminators, areas for further investigation, and collaboration within Lockheed’s own 
Independent Research and Development (IR&D) and Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreement (CRADA) technology culture. These relationships would also help 
integrate the SBIR technologies and firms and allow Lockheed to demonstrate its successes 
and build formal partnerships. 
During the symposium, Dr. Kidalov, from the Senate Small Business Committee, 
lead a panel discussion on incentives for contracting with SBIR firms. Dr. Kidalov noted that 
in his experience, large prime contractors needed a champion, a corporate strategy, and 
incentives to continue using SBIR firms. He noted that these incentives need to go beyond 
the competitive advantages they provide. Dr. Kidalov asked the question of whether or not 
the panelists saw value in a system that would allow for recognition of efforts to contract with 
SBIR firms, perhaps from Congress and the government agencies. All panelists agreed. 
Specifically, in response, a Boeing representative pointed out that incentives are built 
into contracts when agencies award them for many reasons, such as schedule and budget. 
He was pointing out that it should be possible to include similar incentives, such as those for 
working with SBIR firms. An ATK representative agreed that incentives were essential 
because primes, like PMs, were risk adverse by nature. Incentives would encourage them to 
take those risks. 
A Raytheon representative was more specific in response to the question posed by 
Dr. Kidalov. He stated three incentives that would help the case to use SBIR firms. First, to 
streamline and otherwise optimize the SBIR process, which in turn would ensure the 
development of many technologies needed for the long term. Second, an assurance that 
customers have realistic plans to support the transition from Phase II through Phase III. 
Third, was an incentive that SBIR firms help meet the requirement to work with small 
disadvantaged businesses (NAS, 2005, p. 82). 
Reform 3: Encouraging Innovation in Manufacturing 
Section 252 mandates the full implementation of Executive Order No. 13329. The 
impact of Section 252 is that future presidential administrations cannot ignore this order.  
Executive Order No. 13329 was issued on February 24, 2004, by President George W. 
Bush. The goal of the order is outlined in the Introduction section, which stresses the 
importance of the federal government’s role in encouraging technological innovation in the 
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U.S. economy. As part of that encouragement, the order specifically tasks the SBIR and 
SBTT programs with “helping to advance innovation, including innovation in manufacturing, 
through small businesses” (Executive Order No. 13329, 2004, section 1). The executive 
order required that heads of departments and agencies that have an SBIR or STTR program 
“give high priority within such programs to manufacturing-related research and 
development” (Executive Order No. 13329, 2004, section 2). The order places on 
department and agency heads a requirement to provide an annual report to the Small 
Business Administration and to the Director of the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy in which they are to report on their efforts in meeting this order. 
An impact of the executive order issuance was that the U.S. Small Business 
Administration proposed amendments to the SBIR Policy Directive on May 19, 2005, to 
incorporate the goals of the executive order. Although the amendments to this policy 
directive were not finalized, the agencies themselves established their own implementation 
plans.5 
Reform 4: Enhanced Testing & Evaluation 
In order to address another issue that impairs SBIR projects from transitioning to 
Phase III, Section 252 clarifies the definition of what constitutes a commercial application. 
The clarification was necessary in order to remove barriers imposed by overly restrictive 
interpretations of Phase II and Phase III requirements.  Therefore, the definition of a 
“commercial application” was expanded to include test and evaluation of products, services, 
or technologies for use in technical or weapons systems, and, further, awards for testing and 
evaluation of products, services, or technologies for use in technical or weapons systems 
may be made in either the second or the third phase of the SBIR and SBTT programs.6 
Survey Methodology 
Survey Goals 
In order to access effectiveness of efforts designed to increase Phase III 
implementation success rates, especially in regard to the development of Commercialization 
Pilot Projects (CPP), input was sought from program managers and experts within the 
military departments who are involved with the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
program. We asked 102 individuals to complete an online survey. The aim of the survey was 
to document the agency implementations and practice in regard to the Commercialization 
Pilot Program and other Section 252 reforms. With this information, it was then possible to 
identify what was being done to implement Section 252 and how each agency worked to 
meet the congressional intent of the CPP. 
Survey Design 
The survey focuses on seven main research questions from the Congressional 
Guidance Letter to USD(AT&L) Kenneth J. Krieg. 
1. How did the DoD implement the new requirement in Section 252(a) for 
research focus of its SBIR and STTR programs? 
                                                
5 For example, the Air Force, Navy, and Army have all issued directives for implementation. 
6 See Section 252 of H.R 1815. 
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2. How did the DoD and each military department plan to involve acquisition 
program managers and program executive offices in SBIR/STTR topic 
selection and management to ensure that SBIR/STTR is integrated into the 
DoD’s mission and its acquisition framework, as contemplated in Section 
252(a), SBIR Commercialization Pilot Program, and Section 252(c), inclusion 
of testing and evaluation works as part of SBIR/STTR commercialization 
activity? 
3. How did the DoD and each military department’s acquisition program 
managers and program executive officers plan for post-SBIR/STTR funding, 
through the Program Objective Memoranda and other vehicles, to utilize 
SBIR/STTR technology resources in their acquisition process, as stated in 
Section 252(a), SBIR Commercialization Pilot Program? 
4. How did the DoD and each military department plan and implement the SBIR 
Commercialization Pilot Program, and specifically what processes did these 
military Services and defense agencies develop and implement to ensure 
identification of optimal SBIR/STTR Phase I–II projects for accelerated 
transition through this pilot program? 
5. What acquisition incentives and activities did the DoD and each military 
department deploy to accelerate the transition of SBIR/STTR technologies 
into the acquisition process though the pilot program? 
6. What specific reporting requirements did the DoD and each military 
department impose on acquisition program managers, program executive 
officers, and prime contractors as part of the annual evaluative report to 
Congress, as outlined in Section 252(a)? 
7. How did the DoD and each military department implement Executive Order 
No. 13329, Encouraging Innovation In Manufacturing, codified into law as 
part of Section 252(b)? 
Survey Scoring 
Respondents were asked two types of question: those requiring a positive or 
negative response or those requesting a response using a rating scale. 
Respondents were also given the option of choosing, “Don’t Know” or “Not 
Applicable.” 
Survey Subjects 
All DoD agencies and departments participating in SBIR and STTR were asked to 
participate in the survey.  Each point of contact was sent an e-mail with a request to 
participate in the survey and a link to the SurveyMonkey.com website where the online 
survey was posted.  To refresh respondents recollection, the survey was supplemented with 
the text of the act and a copy of the Congressional Guidance Letter, issued jointly by the 
Chair and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship and the Chair of the House Committee on Small Business. Point of 
contacts may have assigned additional respondents within their agency. Respondents were 









The survey was primarily intended to ask responsible agency officials to identify 
practices and polices related to the reforms adopted by Congress and outlined in Section 
252.  
The data collected in the survey is therefore the primary source of the conclusions 
presented. No respondent actually completed the survey in total. This was partly by design, 
as a large number of the survey questions were only presented to the respondent 
depending on the previous answer. 
The conclusions discussed in the following sections are based on results obtained 
when multiple responders provided the answers to the question being asked supplemented 
by reviews of publications and academic literature. 
Survey Results and Analysis 
Response Rate and Background Results 
Organizations Participating and Background 
We asked 102 individuals to complete the online survey. Of those 102, 19 responses 
were received, with the largest number of participants identified as being from Air Force 
organizations. 
Partly as a result of the design of the survey to adjust the questions asked depending 
on the response to previous questions, no one participant completed all 30 questions within 
the survey.  
The organizations responding and their response rates are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Response by Organization 
   
Invited Participant Organization Participated? Number of 
Responses 
Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Small Business Programs No 0 
Army No 0 
Navy Yes 3 
Air Force Yes 4 
Missile Defense Agency No 0 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Yes 1 
Joint Science and Technology Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense 
No 0 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency No 0 
Defense Microelectronics Activity No 0 
Defense Logistics Agency No 0 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency No 0 
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and 
Technology) 
No 0 
U.S. Special Operations Command No 0 
Commercialization Pilot Program Implementing Contractor – Army No 0 
Commercialization Pilot Program Implementing Contractor - Navy No 0 
Total Responses 3 8  
Organizational Alignment of Regulations, Policies, and Procedures With SBIR and 
STTR Research Focus 
Alignment of SBIR/STTR Topics With DoD Research Plans 
Given an opportunity to respond to a question regarding the adoption of regulations, 
policies, or procedures necessary for compliance with the requirement in Section 252 for 
alignment of SBIR and STTR research topics with those set forth in the Joint Warfighting 
Science and Technology Plan, the Defense Technology Area Plan, and the Basis Research 
Plan of the Department of Defense, 50% of the respondents for the organization responded 
that their organization was not in alignment with the plan (Figure 1).  
Of the respondents, 37.5% gave an affirmative response that their organization was 
in alignment with the plan. 
There were 12.5% of the respondents who answered that they did not know if they 
had institutionalized SBIR/STTR topic alignment with the Section 252–identified DoD 
research plans in their organization. 
When the results are broken down by organization (Figure 2), the Navy response 
indicated that it was more in compliance than any other agency, and the Air Force the least. 
Overall, all responding organizations indicated that they did not have the topic alignment 
required by Section 252, as was outlined previously in this paper. 
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Figure 1. SBIR/STTR Policy Alignment With DoD Research Plans 
 
Figure 2. SBIR/STTR Policy Alignment With DoD Research Plans Response by 
Organization 
Analysis. This finding is surprising as the Research Development Testing and 
Evaluation communities control the selection of SBIR/STTR topics in the Air Force (with 
some exception for space-related systems; GAO, 2010, p. 9), and Army, while the Navy 
approaches topic generation by the program offices (DoDIG, 2009). The Army and Air Force 
labs should be well aware of the defense science plans that are required for topic generation 
and the statutory requirements for generating those topics. 
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The conclusion that can be drawn from this data is that either the organizations are 
uninformed regarding the statutory alignment requirement, or they are aware but do not put 
the requirements in place. Further research would have to be conducted to determine which 
of the two conclusions is correct. 
Alignment of SBIR/STTR Topics With DoD Research Plans—Program 
Manager/PEO Input 
With a response of 50%, most respondents answered with a “not applicable” to the 
question as to whether there were regulations, policies, or procedures in place to provide for 
the input of program manager and/or program executive officers to determine the SBIR and 
STTR research and development (R&D) focus areas (see Figure 3). 
In contrast, 37.5% of the respondents answered positively that there were 
regulations, policies, or procedures in place to provide input of program managers and/or 
program executive officers, as required by Section 252. There were 12.5% who answered 
that they did not know. 
As shown in Figure 4, the response by organization to this question again shows the 
Navy indicating its compliance with Section 252, which calls for the input of program 
managers and program executive officers in the identification of areas of research and 
development of SBIR and STTR program areas of research.7  These results mirror those of 
the previous question. 
 
Figure 3. Program Manager/Executive Officer Input Into SBIR/STTR Focus Areas 
                                                
7 This requirement is also more fully developed within paragraph 3 of the Congressional Guidance Letter. 
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Figure 4. Program Manager/Executive Officer Input Into SBIR/STTR Focus Areas 
Response by Organization 
Analysis. However much the response of the Navy organization shows its 
understanding of this section of the legislation, the overwhelming response by all 
organizations indicated that the involvement of program managers and program executive 
officers in determining focus areas was not applicable to their SBIR/STTR program 
implementation. 
This finding is also surprising, especially since a 2006 memorandum from the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) issued the SBIR policy requiring “at least 50% of 
SBIR topics have acquisition community endorsement or sponsorship” (Krieg, 2006). As 
reported in the DoDIG report of January 30, 2009, which related the results of  a Navy 2007 
SBIR symposium, it was noted that the Navy writes SBIR topics that are closely aligned with 
the needs of the acquisition community for easier transitions of technology projects. As a 
result, Navy topics are less risky, and they transition to commercialization (Phase III) more 
easily then the topics developed by other means (DoDIG, 2009, p. 9). In addition to the 
success reported by the Navy, involvement of the acquisition community in topic generation 
was also recommended as a best practice in a congressionally mandated SBIR study 
conducted by the National Academy of Sciences (2009). 
As was also noted in the DoDIG report, this requirement for involving the acquisition 
community members in the development of topics for SBIR/STTR projects may pose a 
problem for DARPA because their focus is not on “urgent needs and requirements” but 
rather on “radical innovations that may take years to prove feasible” (DoDIG, 2009, p. 10). 
Consequently, an area of further research may be how should an organization with a focus 
such as DARPAs participate in SBIR/STTR topic generation, and what guidelines should be 
provided to smooth Phase III transitions for organizations that have a similar focus? 
Again, additional research would have to be conducted to determine the reasons 
behind these responses were (i.e., ignorance of the requirement, or disregard). 
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Alignment of SBIR/STTR Topics With DoD Research Plans—Quadrennial 
Strategic Review 
With a combined response rate of 75%, most respondents answered with a “don’t 
know” or “never participated” response to the question as to whether there was 
organizational participation in a Quadrennial Strategic Review of SBIR and STTR programs 
in accordance with the regulations, policies, or procedures that align topics with DoD 
research plans and program manager/program executive officer inputs to the same (see 
Figure 5). 
Only a quarter, 25%, indicated that in either “most instances” or in “some instances” 
their organization participated in these reviews as required by Section 252 (a)(1). 
 
Figure 5. Response to Quadrennial Review 
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Figure 6. Response to Quadrennial Review by Responding Organization 
Analysis. The organizational responses to this question were interesting. The Air 
Force responders either did not participate or didn’t know if their organization participated in 
the Secretary of Defense Quadrennial Strategic Review. The Navy split between one 
respondent indicating that the organization had participated in some instances, and the 
other respondent indicated that the organization had never participated. One other Navy 
respondent did not provide any answer to the question. 
Of interest also was the response from the NGIA, which responded that their 
organization participated in most instances. This response seemingly contradicts the 
responses from the previous questions in which they answered either in the negative or not 
applicable to those parts of the legislation that required alignment with DoD research plans 
and program manager/program executive officer input to the Quadrennial Strategic Review.  
In any case, one can conclude from these results that the participation of the DoD 
organizations in the Secretary of Defense’s Quadrennial Strategic Review of SBIR/STTR is 
low. Furthermore, during literature review for the purposes of this report, no information was 
found regarding the SBIR/STTR Quadrennial Strategic Review. This may be due to the 
nature of the review itself or—what is more likely in the opinion of the authors—that the 
Review has not been conducted as the legislation stipulates. The fact that since Section 252 
was adopted, there have been two Quadrennial Defense Reviews, one in 2006 and the 
other in 2010, neither of which apparently had a Quadrennial Strategic Review conducted 
thereafter. 
Creation of the Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP) 
Creation of the Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) 
Paragraph (y)(1) of Section 252 gives the Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, and 
Air Force the authority to create a Commercialization Pilot Program with the stated goal to 
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“accelerate the transition of technologies, products, and services developed under the Small 
Business Innovation Research Program to Phase III, including the acquisition process.”  
With a response of 62.5%, most respondents answered with an affirmative to the question 
as to whether their organization created the Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP; see 
Figure 7). 
However, 25% of the respondents answered in the negative that their organization 
had not created the CPP, while 12.5% answered that creation of the CPP was “not 
applicable” to their organization. 
 
Figure 7. Response to Creation of the Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) 
 








Analysis. The majority of the military departments represented by the survey 
respondents indicated that they had created the Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP), 
with the Air Force slightly more responding in the affirmative then the Navy respondents 
(Figure 8). 
The legislation’s language allowed the departments to create this program; they were 
not required to do so by the legislation. However, if they did choose to create the CPP 
program, there were specific requirements that had to be followed because the CPP is self-
funding. Whether the requirements were followed forms the basis for the next questions in 
this section. 
In the case of the Navy, whether the CPP was created as a separate program is a 
subject of some conjecture. In a report done by the Navy SBIR program office titled A 
Report on the Navy SBIR Program: Best Practices, Roadblocks, and Recommendations for 
Technology Transition and released in 2008, it was stated, “One could argue that the Navy’s 
SBIR program already meets the intent of the CPP legislation and we should continue 
business as usual” (Navy Small Business Innovation Research Program Office, 2008, p. iii). 
That study stated that the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program (TAP) assists SBIR/STTR 
participates and helps to meet knowledge and support gaps by providing support to these 
program participants within Phase II in order “to help the SBIR firm delivery [sic] a 
technology product to DoD and the Navy” (p. 35). 
In any case, the Navy does have what it calls “Phase II.5,” which includes the TAP 
and refers to it as a CPP program (http://www.navysbir.com/cpp.htm). It utilizes self-funding 
set-asides for the CPP to pay for the Transition Assistance Program and has the System 
Command (SYSCOM) SBIR transition manager making the determination as to which firm 
gets invited to participate. In addition, each SYSCOM has its award structure and 
requirements to receive be selected for Phase II.5. 
This paper does not attempt to make any determination as to whether the Navy SBIR 
program with the TAP and Phase II.5 component included does or does not meet the 
definition of the CPP; it is clear from the evidence presented previously that the Navy 
believes that this is the case. Rather, the presence of the TAP program may be confused 
with the CPP, which is why the Navy response seems to contradict itself. This, however, is 
not a sematic issue, as Section 252 has specific conditions on the usage of CPP funds. 
In addition to the Air Force and Navy creation of the CPP, the Army, the Missile 
Defense Agency, and the Joint Science & Technology Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense (JSTO–CBD), created CPP programs. 
Commercial Pilot Program (CPP)—Identification of Projects for Rapid 
Transitioning Through CPP 
With a response of 62.5%, most respondents answered with an affirmative to the 
question as to whether their organization had formal processes or procedures for the 
identification of optimal SBIR Phase I or Phase II projects for rapid transitioning and related 
assistance through the Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP) into Phase III and the 
acquisition processes, as required in Section 252 (y)(2) (see Figure 9). 
Conversely, 25% of the respondents answered in the negative that their organization 
did not have the processes or procedures in place, and 12.5% answered that creation of the 
processes or procedures was “not applicable” to their organization. 
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The breakdown of the respondents to this question (Figure 10) mirrored that of the 
previous question: namely, the Air Force led the Navy in answering affirmatively to this 
question; the one NGIA and one Air Force respondent answered negatively; and the one 
Navy respondent answered as not applicable to their organization. 
 
Figure 9. Response to Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) Identification of Projects 
for Rapid Transitioning Through CPP 
 
Figure 10. Response by Service to Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) Identification 
of Projects for Rapid Transitioning Through CPP 
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Analysis. On the whole, it can be concluded that most agencies that created the 
CPP came up with some sort of process for the identification of projects for rapid 
transitioning into the Commercialization Phase of the SBIR/STTR program. The negative 
responses to this question need to be viewed in the context of the previous question, 
namely that the respondents either did not create the CPP program in their organization, 
mixed up the CPP with other transition assistance programs, or were not clear about the 
legislative requirement. 
To understand these results, one must look at the various CPP programs for their 
approach to identification. The Air Force approaches SBIR project identification for its CPP 
program using two approaches: technology needs identified by an Air Force acquisition 
organization and technology needs identified by a single major contractor. In both 
approaches, “data mining” of DoD Phase II databases occurred by Air Force experts at the 
various Air Force Product Centers and Air Force Research Lab. The experts look for 
promising candidates based on program executive office needs. The results of the search 
are then provided to major contractors of Air Force acquisition organizations, which then 
conduct interviews with the various small businesses during Industry Interchange 
Workshops. Then, the technical points of contact and the major contractors identify 
promising SBIR projects for inclusion into the CPP (Flake, 2007). 
The Navy approach involves the program executive office and the System Command 
SBIR program manager and a technical monitor to decide which Phase II programs get 
included into their CPP program. Each System Command has its own identification 
processes relating to their areas of interest (http://www.navysbir.com/cpp.htm). Since 2008 
the Navy has also participated with the Air Force in Joint DoD Component Industry SBIR 
CPP Technology Interchange Workshops, although recent resource constraints make Navy 
attendance in the future questionable.8 
The responses also relate to how each Service conducts initial topic selection for the 
SBIR program.  In  earlier studies conducted by the RAND Corporation and reported in a 
2009 DoDIG report, the approaches to topic generation—and, as a result, projects—of the 
various military departments was discovered and analyzed. According to the report, the Air 
Force and the Army “generated a majority of their topics in laboratories, whereas the Navy 
generated a majority of its topics through the acquisition program offices” (DoDIG, 2009, p. 
10). The DoDIG’s report also concurred with the 2007 National Research Council report 
titled SBIR and the Phase III Challenge of Commercialization that the Navy approach to 
topic generation “expedited the transition to commercialization” (p. 9). Based on the current 
approach of the Army and Air Force, while there may have been improvements in the 
transition process of the respective CPP programs, the Navy model appears to provide for 
greater acquisition program input with regard to generating topics that will be successfully 
transitioned into DoD acquisition phases. 
Commercial Pilot Program (CPP)—Certification of Technology Projects for 
Assistance by Department Secretary 
With a response of 50%, most respondents answered that they did not know whether 
their organization required that SBIR Phase I and Phase II projects be certified by the 
Secretary of Defense or by the secretary of a military department that the project’s 
successful transition to Phase III and into the acquisition process is expected to meet high 
                                                
8 Fact sheet available at http://www.wpafb.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=15879. 
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priority military requirements of the relevant department as a precondition for receiving 
assistance under the CPP (see Figure 11). 
More than a third, 37.5%, responded that their organization never required the 
certification. Only 12.5% stated that their organization frequently requires the certification. 
 
Figure 11. Response to Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) Certification of Projects 
by Department Secretary 
 
Figure 12. Response by Service to Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) Certification 
of Projects by Department Secretary 
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Figure 13. Response by Service to Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) Certification 
of Projects by Department Secretary (Adjusted for Removal of Non-CPP Responders) 
Analysis. A casual look at the responses from the various Services to this question 
would indicate a large portion of the respondents’ organizations either do not know if the 
organization is keeping this requirement or that they never have keep it (Figure 12). 
When one removes the respondents who previously answered “never” or “don’t 
know/not applicable” to the question of CPP creation from the results, one is left with a 
clearer picture of the situation (Figure 13). 
This would indicate that the Air Force organizations, which are the most frequent 
respondents confirming creation of the CPP, do not know if their military department has 
implemented the requirement for certification in writing required in Section 252(y)(2). 
One also sees the Navy being split on whether this is done in its department, with 
one respondent answering “frequently” and the other answering “never.” 
These responses indicate that there is another area for further research needing to 
be done to determine the type and nature of the responses to this question. 
As was previously outlined and which will be further expanded upon later in this 
paper, the Air Force, Army, and certain Navy organizations utilize contractors such as 
MILCON Ventures Partners, MacAulay-Brown, Willcor and Dawnbreaker to assist in SBIR- 
and CPP-related projects at various phases. Some of these firms assist to the extent of 
helping government personnel to determine whether specific small business firms are able 
to participate in providing proposals to announced topics at Phase I and whether the Phase I 
and Phase II firms will be allowed to participate in the CPP projects. In these instances, 
these contractors do a “vetting” of technology needs and technology SBIR firms. The reason 
for the department secretary’s certification as required in Section 252 was to make certain 
that projects seeking to progress though the CPP process into commercialization phases 
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met the “high priority military requirements” of each department.9  Whether contractors 
should be involved in making this determination is at the very least questionable since 
delegation of this function to contactors increases the potential for misalignment between 
military requirements and CPP assistance funds and makes the CPP less predictable for 
small business. As the results to this question show, this requirement is not being met.  
Further research into the role of contractors in the determination of project approvals needs 
to be addressed. 
Commercial Pilot Program (CPP)—Input by Program Managers or Program 
Executive Officers 
With a response of 75%, a majority of the respondents answered with an affirmative 
to the question as to whether their organization had formal processes or procedures for 
requiring program managers or program executive officers to provide input concerning SBIR 
topic generation and on accelerated integration of SBIR projects into the acquisition 
programs (see Figure 14). 
The last quarter was evenly split between the respondents who answered in the 
negative that their organization did not have the processes or procedures in place and who 
answered that creation of the processes or procedures was “not applicable” to their 
organization. 
 
Figure 14. Response to Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) Input by Program 
Managers or Program Executive Officers 
                                                
9 Section 252 (y)(2). 
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Figure 15. Response by Service to Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) Input by 
Program Managers or Program Executive Officers 
Analysis. The responses by Service to this question (Figure 15) indicate whether 
their organization is in adherence to the requirements of the statute. However, the NGIA 
respondent who had previously indicated that their organization had not created the 
Commercialization Pilot Program still answered affirmatively that they had formal processes 
or procedures for program manager or program executive officer input as part of the CPP. 
Even when taking into account the seemingly erroneous response discussed above, 
the conclusion here is that the organizations are largely, but not always, involving the PEO 
and PMs in topic generation within the context of the CPP. This is in contrast to the 
responses given to the question regarding PEO and PM involvement in topic generation in 
general reported in the section titled Alignment of SBIR/STTR Topics With DoD Research 
Plans—Program Manager/PEO Input. In that section, recall that over 50% of the 
respondents answered that involvement of the PEO and PM was “not applicable.” 
The involvement of program executive officers and program managers is critical in 
the topic generation and identification of projects into commercialization. In a 2009 study 
entitled An Assessment of the Small Business Innovation Research Program at the 
Department of Defense, the National Academies of Sciences identified that “active 
championing (of SBIR projects) by Program Executive Officers seems to be a critical 
ingredient in Phase III success” (p. 182).  The study also suggested having senior managers 
insist that all program managers “integrate SBIR fully into their acquisition programs” (p. 
183).  These two recommendations represent a cultural change component that Section 252 
tried to achieve by requiring PM/PEO input in identifications of areas of effort and by 
reporting out of the activities of the program managers, program executive officers, and 
prime contractors in the form of the annual evaluative report on the CPP. 
Another issue that involves program managers and program executive officers is that 
of topic generation. According to the Government Accountability Office (2010) report Space 
Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing Technologies Developed under the Small 
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Business Innovation Research Program, small businesses that were involved with SBIR 
projects in DoD space related technologies related that there was limited “pull” from the 
acquisition programs (p. 23). According to the report, three reasons were given for this lack 
of “pull”: DoD topics in which there is no validated requirement, short tenure among DoD 
officials responsible for progress, and lack of SBIR knowledge among DoD officials (p. 23). 
Certainly, topic generation by the program managers and program executive officers should 
include validated requirements and be within the ability of the senior leadership to enforce. 
Lack of SBIR knowledge is being addressed through more SBIR-related training. Still, the 
issue of “pull” is again related to changes in organizational culture that apparently remains 
difficult to accomplish within the DoD. 
Contractor Influence on Selection of Projects Within the Commercialization Pilot 
Program (CPP) 
Commercial Pilot Program (CPP)—Contractor Influence 
With a response of 83.3%, most respondents answered that their organization did 
not make decisions to select SBIR Phase I or Phase II projects for CPP assistance based 
on or influenced by contractors supporting the CPP program for the organization (see Figure 
16). 
However, 16.7% stated that their organizations’ decisions to select SBIR Phase I or 
Phase II project was in some way influenced by one or more contractors supporting the CPP 
program for the organization. 
With the exception of one respondent from the Air Force, all other Services, including 
all other Air Force respondents, indicated that contractor influence on decisions to select 
Phase I or II projects for CPP does not occur (see Figure 17). 
 
Figure 16. Response to Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) Contractor Influence 
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Figure 17. Response by Service to Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) Contractor 
Influence 
Analysis. This finding is in contrast to the publically announced role of contractors in 
the various CPP programs. With the passage of the SBIR Reauthorization Act of 2000 
(Public Law 106-554), which amended Section 9 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 638), 
federal agencies were allowed to enter into an agreement with a vendor to provide 
“technical services.” The text of the section is as follows: 
(q) Discretionary technical assistance  
(1) In general  
Each Federal agency required by this section to conduct an SBIR program may 
enter into an agreement with a vendor selected under paragraph (2) to provide 
small business concerns engaged in SBIR projects with technical assistance 
services, such as access to a network of scientists and engineers engaged in a 
wide range of technologies, or access to technical and business literature 
available through on-line data bases, for the purpose of assisting such concerns 
in— 
(A) making better technical decisions concerning such projects;  
(B) solving technical problems which arise during the conduct of such projects;  
(C) minimizing technical risks associated with such projects; and  
(D) developing and commercializing new commercial products and processes 
resulting from such projects.  
(2) Vendor selection  
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Each agency may select a vendor to assist small business concerns to meet the 
goals listed in paragraph (1) for a term not to exceed 3 years. Such selection 
shall be competitive and shall utilize merit-based criteria.10 
Using the text of the law as a standard, the role of contractors in the CPP program 
can be examined. For example, within the Army, MILCOM Venture Partners is a firm that the 
Army selected to oversee its CPP implementation. The following information was found on 
their website (www.milcomvp.com) and describes their role in the Army CPP program: 
MILCOM Venture Partners (MILCOM) was selected as the Army’s contractor to 
help manage the CPP, and will: 1) review current SBIR Phase II projects and 
recommend approximately 25 projects for participation in CPP; 2) provide 
assistance intended to accelerate technology transition and commercialization to 
the projects selected for CPP participation; and 3) recommend the amount of 
additional funding each participating SBIR Phase II project will be allocated from 
the $15 million CPP fund. In making recommendations for participation in CPP, 
the following characteristics will be given significant consideration by MILCOM: 
1. The Phase II technology meets a high priority Army requirement; 
2. The technology can be rapidly transitioned to Army acquisition and/or a 
commercial product; and,  
3. Transition to military or commercial products will provide a significant 
financial return on the investment made in the technology by the SBIR 
Program, in the form of non-SBIR investment in such technology and 
product revenue. 
The Air Force has contracted with MacAulay-Brown, Inc. (MacB) to provide a lead 
role, variously described as that of SBIR/STTR program manager11  or, more recently, as 
SBIR/STTR project lead (http://www.afsbirsttr.com/Poc/Pocs.aspx).  The role of MacAulay-
Brown was described in their press release at the time of the contract award: 
The Government-MacB Team will focus on improving the process of identifying 
and developing topics that address urgent warfighter needs and transition 
successful results to acquisition programs while strengthening awareness, 
involvement and advocacy of key S&T customers/stakeholders. 
(http://www.macb.com/about-us/company-news.php) 
The Navy also involves contractors to assist in their CPP program. The contractor 
firms Dawnbreaker Inc., and Willcor have been contracted to provide program management 
support, technology transition, and risk management to firms that have SBIR/STTR projects. 
The firm’s involvement in CPP is outlined as follows: 
 Willcor is under contract to the Navy to assist companies with the use of 
Technology Risk Identification & Mitigation Software (TRIMS) for SBIR, a web 
based tool for risk assessment management, the performance of independent 
                                                
10 The full text can be retrieved at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00000638----
000-.html#FN-1. 









assessments, and assistance in developing risk mitigation strategies and 
plans. 
 Both Willcor and Dawnbreaker are under contract with the Navy to provide 
assistance to SBIR firms in planning their transition strategies. 
 Both Willcor and Dawnbreaker are under contract to assist firms with 
identifying issues, preparing manufacturing plans, and conducting 
Manufacturing and Production Readiness assessments. 
 Technology Readiness Assessments are used to assist firms in determining 
the development status of their technology (TRL) as well as conformance to 
requirements. Willcor is under contract to the Navy to provide these 
assessments. (http://www.navysbir.com/Navy_CPP-09.pdf) 
Dawnbreaker’s role within the Navy’s Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) CPP 
program includes having 
to provide Program and Technology Transition Management Support to the 
NAVAIR SBIR Program Office to implement a CPP which assists the NAVAIR 
Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and NAVAIR Acquisition Program 
Management Offices (PMAs) in identifying SBIR topics that meet the needs of 
the war-fighter, have the potential for rapid transition and to execute their 
transition from Phase II to Phase III and insertion into a Program of Record. 
(http://www.dawnbreaker.com/defense/navair-cpp.php) 
Dawnbreaker is also the major contractor in the Navy’s Technology Assistance 
Program (TAP). This program assists Phase II SBIR/STTR awardees with “the services of a 
business acceleration manager, a market researcher, and others to accelerate the transition 
of their technology. This is accomplished through the application of a proven process and 
deliverables, developed collaboratively by the small business and the Navy TAP team” 
(http://www.dawnbreaker.com/defense/navy-tap.php). 
It is clear that there is significant contractor involvement in the CPP programs at the 
various Services. What is not clear, however, is whether any conflict of interest with Federal 
Acquisition Regulation provisions and the various programs exist. This is significant because 
FAR Section 9.5 prohibits a contractor from having consultant conflicts of interest. FAR 
Section 9.505-1 specifically prohibits a contractor that has “provide(d) systems engineering 
and technical direction for a system but does not have overall contractual responsibility for 
its development, its integration, assembly, and checkout, or its production” from having a 
contract awarded to them for the system or to be a subcontractor or consultant to a supplier 
of the system or any major components. While the scope of the involvement of the 
contractors outlined above does not appear to be in conflict with the above quoted section, 
there may be some unintentional abuses and possibly the role that contractors are actively 
playing exceeds that of the definition of “technical assistance” as was outlined in 15 U.S.C. 
638. The conclusion here is that this is an area in which more research should be 
conducted. 
CPP Incentives and Initiatives 
Incentivizing Within Commercial Pilot Program (CPP) 
With a response of 66.7%, most respondents answered that their organization did 
not make develop or deploy acquisition incentives to accelerate the transition of SBIR/STTR 
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technologies into the acquisition process though the Commercial Pilot Program (see Figure 
18). 
A third, 33.3%, indicated that their organization did develop and deploy acquisition 
incentives to accelerate the transition of SBIR/STTR technologies into the acquisition 
process as part of the CPP. 
 
Figure 18. Response to Acquisition Incentivizing Within Commercial Pilot Program 
(CPP) 
 
Figure 19. Response by Service to Acquisition Incentivizing Within Commercial 
Pilot Program (CPP) 
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Analysis. The two Navy respondents who had confirmed creation of the CPP also 
were the only respondents who indicated that the Navy used incentives within the 
Commercialization Pilot Program. The Air Force respondents indicated that the Air Force did 
not develop any acquisition incentives, even though this is well within the scope of the 
SBIR/STTR program and must be reported to Congress each year (see Figure 19). 
The subject of incentives was a topic of great interest at the SBIR and the Phase III 
Challenge of Commercialization Symposium held on June 14, 2005. The symposium was 
convened by the National Academies of Science (2005) and focused on the 
commercialization of SBIR-funded innovation projects at the DoD and NASA (p. xv). The 
term “incentives” was used to address methods of change techniques with the various 
targets being government managers at multiple levels, prime contractors, and small 
businesses. The ideas suggested took the form of programmatic changes to funding, 
training, risk reduction (for all three entities, small business, prime contractor and 
government), alignment with existing projects, and education outreach regarding the SBIR 
program. The importance of incentives was stressed repeatedly by the participants of this 
symposium, and within the report of the proceedings this is evidenced by the following two 
quotes: 
In this era of globalization, optimizing the ability of small businesses to develop 
and commercialize new products is essential for U.S. competitiveness and 
national security. Developing better incentives to spur innovative ideas, 
technologies, and products—and ultimately to bring them to market—is thus a 
central policy challenge. (NAS, 2005, p. 3) 
To capitalize on SBIR’s potential, both better information (for small companies 
and large prime contractors) and supportive incentives are necessary. (NAS, 
2005, p. 28) 
Section 252 utilizes the term “incentives” specifically in paragraph (y)(5) with regard 
to the reporting of such in the annual evaluative report of the Secretary of Defense to the 
Senate committees on Armed Services and Small Business and Entrepreneurship and 
House committees on Armed Services and Small Business, but the Congressional 
Guidance Letter gives further instruction with regard to the intent of Congress to have the 
DoD consider issuing “binding directives, contract clauses, or regulatory amendments 
through the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to facilitate the 
requisite incentives” (p. 3). 
In the 2006 SBIR CPP Report to Congress, the Department of Defense stated its 
intention to utilize incentives: 
The Department is exploring a range of incentives to stimulate the transition of 
SBIR funded technology for promulgation throughout the Department via 
appropriate mechanisms. Initiatives under consideration include: extension of 
SBIR Phase III permissive sole-source authority to SBIR subcontracts, 
reinforcement of SBIR Phase III sourcing authority and data rights, formal 
consideration of SBIR technology transition planning during acquisition review 
processes, favorable treatment of proposals which employ SBIR technologies or 
partnerships, use of incentive or award fees for SBIR-technology sourcing; wider 
employment of SBIR Phase III contracts toward meeting small business sourcing 
goals, to include possible multiple small business credits; and encouraging 
individual performance bonuses for personnel affecting SBIR technology 
transition. The new National Security Personnel System (NSPS) in the process of 
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being rolled-out across the Department is well suited to implement this type of 
performance-based compensation. It will be up to each participating component 
and their subcomponents to take advantage of this opportunity to set output-
based goals to measure this dimension of performance for relevant program 
officials while ensuring the integrity of source selection activities. 
(USD[AT&L/OSBP], 2007, p. 13) 
The lack of reported incentive usage would indicate a missed opportunity by the 
Services. The different approaches to incentives as well as the level of utilization can be 
found in Table 2. 
Incentivizing Within Commercial Pilot Program (CPP)—Types of Incentives 
Deployed 
Since the Navy respondents were the only ones who indicated the usage of 
incentives, all of the information in Table 2 is related to usage of the incentives within the 
Navy organizations, but the table also includes all of the types of incentives that could be 
utilized. 
As shown in Table 2, the most utilized incentives were as follows: 
 educational and business development assistance to SBIR firms focused on 
commercialization in federal and dual-use markets, and 
 outreach and advocacy with large prime contractors as well as defense 
acquisition and program management officials. 
And while having a high utilization, not used as frequently as the two above was the 
following: 
 contract clauses or regulatory provisions expressly confirming SBIR data 
rights protections at Phase III at the prime contracting and subcontracting 
levels. Such clauses are set forth in FAR 52.227-20. 
In contrast, the least utilized incentive method was that of contract incentive clauses 
and bonuses to large prime contractors that integrate SBIR and/or STTR technologies. 
An area of additional research might therefore be the use of contract clauses or 
incentives to increase the transition of projects into Phase III as large prime contractors 
specially requested in the National Academies of Science SBIR Symposium (2005, p. 27). It 
is also worth studying whether funding currently spent in outreach and education may be 
more effective when redirected to these types of incentives. 
Table 2. Response to Acquisition Incentivizing Within Commercial Pilot Program 
(CPP) Types of Incentives Deployed 
Which type of incentives and activities did your organization develop and deploy as 
part of the CPP? (Select all that were utilized and indicate frequency of use) 
 









a. Educational and 
business development 
assistance to SBIR 
1 1 0 0 0 2 Most utilized 
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firms focused on 
commercialization in 
Federal and dual-use 
markets 
b. Outreach and 
advocacy with large 
prime contractors as 




1 1 0 0 0 2 Most utilized 
c. Contract incentive 
clauses and bonuses 
to large prime 
contractors that 
integrate SBIR and/or 
STTR technologies 
0 0 0 1 0 1 Least utilized 
d. Mentor-protégé 
arrangements for the 
benefit of SBIR and/or 
STTR firms 
0 0 1 1 0 2 Some utilization
e. Dedication of 
specific acquisition 
dollars for integration 




0 0 1 1 0 2 Some utilization
f. Contract clauses or 
regulatory provisions 
expressly confirming 
SBIR data rights 
protections at Phase 
III at the prime  
contracting and 
subcontracting levels 













0 1 0 1 0 2 Some utilization
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
The overall conclusion of this paper is that while the Department of Defense began 
implementation of the DoD SBIR CPP program and other Section 252 SBIR/STTR reforms, 
progress is uneven.  Specifically, military departments (MILDEPs) and DoD agencies 
participating in SBIR and STTR programs have not uniformly conformed to the mandatory 
Section 252 reforms.  When the Departments of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force 
implemented the optional Commercialization Pilot Program, they commonly used the CPP 
funds to hire business development and venture capital contractors as transition assistance 
advisers.  Although transition assistance advising is recognized by the Congressional 
Guidance Letter as a valuable form of assistance, the DoD and MILDEPs seemed to 
disregard several other CPP elements that were expressly spelled in the statute.  For 
instance, the departments have largely not fulfilled the condition of secretarial certification of 
high military priority before technologies can qualify for CPP assistance, and have declined 
to implement the CPP incentive authorities to the maximum extent practicable.  
Unquestionably, the CPP informs the DoD acquisition community about valuable SBIR 
technologies and helps SBIR firms engage in planning for SBIR technology insertion within 
the DoD.  However, as currently implemented, the CPP is not likely to significantly 
streamline the Phase III transition process, to change the culture of major acquisition 
program offices with regards to SBIR, to reduce technology insertion risk, or to incentivize 
leading prime contractors to utilize SBIR firms in major defense systems.  Legislative 
reforms are needed to rebalance and strengthen the CPP and other Section 252 reforms. 
Answers to Research Questions 
Alignment with DoD Research Plans 
The conclusion we reach to the question as to whether the military Services have 
aligned their SBIR/STTR topics with DoD research plans, which would include PM/PEO 
inputs to couple acquisition focus with research needs and have these certified by the 
respective military secretaries, is that this has not occurred at all. This is the case even 
though the Section 252 legislation and Under Secretary of Defense SBIR policy requires 
that this occur. We are left with trying to determine an explanation for why this could have 
been the case.  Taking a positive perspective on this subject, we suggest that either there is 
a level of ignorance of the statue and policy, which can be remedied by education and 
management actions, or that the respondents just did not know the answer to the survey 
questions. On the other hand, this may also suggest that there is resistance in the DoD 
organization to taking a new approach to topic creation. This, in turn, indicates a challenge 
to an organization’s culture, which will be more difficult to change, but not impossible, when 
combined again with education and a strong influence from upper levels of management. In 
any case, the responses to this question would indicate that opportunities for further 
research exist in trying to determine why the respondents answered in the way they did and 
to effect change leading to alignment. 
Commercialization Pilot Program 
The conclusion we reach as to whether the Commercialization Pilot Program was 
created and was conducted within the requirements of Section 252 is a qualified yes. The 
Services reported, and documentary evidence exists for the Army (which did not participate 
in the survey), that there has been a CPP created in each of the major military Services and 
that there is largely input by program managers/program executive officers in the selection 
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of SBIR/STTR projects to be included in the CPP. The overall implementation of the 
Commercialization Pilot Program was positive, but suffered from the seeming ignorance of 
the secretarial certification reporting requirements of the legislation, the potential 
inappropriate use of contractors resulting in their performance of roles that are governmental 
functions, and the low utilization of incentives. These findings were the negative aspects of 
the answer. Those Services that did implement the CPP seemed to pick and choose which 
requirements within the legislation they would implement.  
As mentioned previously, our research has shown that there had been contractors 
performing some of the functions that were delegated to the department secretary, including 
the certification process to determine which projects are to be given assistance. Contractor 
participation in the certification process and the approach to use contractors as 
“gatekeepers” within SBIR Phase I and II projects shows that contractor influence in those 
military Service’s SBIR/STTR CPP programs is organic—perhaps not by design, but 
nevertheless is present throughout. This may create issues in the CPP decision-making 
process, leading to misalignment of CPP resources. We suggest that additional research be 
performed to look at this issue and to make certain governmental functions are being 
performed by the proper government authorities, as well as to erect barriers to potential 
areas of conflict of interest.  
Our research also showed the lack of incentives being utilized within the DoD 
SBIR/STTR CPP. As was noted in the Department of Defense report to Congress on the 
Commercialization Pilot Program Report for Fiscal Year 2006, the DoD stipulated that it 
would undertake an exploration of the use of incentives to encourage the transition of SBIR 
technologies throughout the DoD. Four years later our research has determined that 
incentive use is almost non-existent and that incentive usage should be emphasized or re-
emphasized to the Services. This is an area in which more research should be conducted to 
ascertain the apparent resistance of the Services to incentivizing SBIR participants. 
Promotion of Manufacturing Innovation 
Our survey did not succeed in collecting responses to how the Services and the DoD 
in general performed the implementation of Executive Order No. 13329. What we did find by 
doing literature review shows that the Services have posted plans on how to encourage 
manufacturing in their respective SBIR/STTR programs at publically available websites. The 
Executive Order No. 13329 webpage on the DoD SBIR/STTR site lists links to the Army’s, 
Navy’s, Air Force’s, and DARPA’s Executive Order No. 13329 Manufacturing Innovation 
Plans (http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/sbir/execorder/index.htm). 
This report does not make any conclusions regarding these efforts and suggests that 
further research be conducted to ascertain compliance with Section 252 and congressional 
intent in that regard. 
A Final Observation 
As we went about compiling our findings for inclusion in this section, it seems then 
that a possible reason for the seeming disconnect between some of the specific items 
mentioned in the legislation, such as the creation of the CPP, and the intent of Congress as 
outlined in the Letter of Congressional Intent, such as the stipulation of certain types of 
incentives and the actual implementation may be due to the lack of the dissemination of the 
Letter of Congressional Intent to the respective Services’ secretaries. On May, 16, 2006, the 
letter was written to the Honorable Kenneth J. Kreig, then the Under Secretary of Defense 
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for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and requested a meeting by June 16 to discuss 
how the DoD was planning on implementing Section 252 and requested a written status be 
presented at that meeting. There is no evidence that suggests that the meeting occurred or 
that the written status was provided. Mr. Kreig announced his resignation on June 6, 2007, 
effective July 20 of the same year. What level of circulation the letter received initially and 
subsequently is unknown, and while speculative, we suggest that this may be one possible 
reason, but not the only possible one, as to why the “disconnect” may have occurred. 
Additional research may be able to determine whether this suggestion is correct, or as an 
alternative, the complete intention of Congress in regard to the desired outcomes and 
means to attain those outcomes could be spelled out specifically in new legislation. 
Recommendations for CPP Reforms 
Based on the examination of Section 252 legislative text, SBIR-related proceedings 
of the National Academies Symposium, congressional guidance on Section 252, best 
practices available across the federal government and internationally, and the DoD-wide 
survey of SBIR and STTR managers, the following recommendations are made for action by 
the Secretary of Defense and of the military departments and, where appropriate, by 
Congress. 
1. Create a Streamlined “One-Stop Shop” Process for Assisting SBIR/STTR 
Firms With Technology Transition, Including Development, Testing & 
Evaluation, and Procurement 
It is clear from research reported in this paper that one of the main obstacles to 
successful technology transition in the Department of Defense is confusion and lack of 
information on available assistance programs within government managers and small 
businesses/industry alike.  This confusion and lack of information forces small firms to spend 
much time navigating the DoD bureaucracy for technology funding sources and introduces 
uncertainty that discourages acquisition program managers and program executive offices 
from planning for insertion of technologies developed  by small firms.  A streamlined “one-
stop shop” process for SBIR/STTR firms set up within each military department and/or within 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense could reduce bureaucratic barriers for small firms and 
interested PMs/PEOs.  If an SBIR/STTR technology looks promising but would require 
planned and/or targeted assistance with development, testing, or evaluation, the “one stop 
shop” could help tailor the appropriate funding mechanisms and assist with technology 
roadmapping, leading to procurement by the Department of Defense under contracts or by 
major prime contractors under subcontracts.  The “one-stop shop” could reduce or 
altogether eliminate the need for private advisory and assistance contractors, including 
venture capitalists, to act as gatekeepers for Phase III procurements and as intermediaries 
between defense acquisition programs and SBIR firms. 
2. Raise MILDEP Acquisition Community Sponsorship of SBIR/STTR Topics 
From at Least 50% to at Least 75%, Seek Prime Contracts’ Recommendations 
of Topics for MILDEP Acquisition Community Sponsorship, and Publicly 
Designate the Existence of Sponsorship in the Solicitation 
As our study confirms, the key technology transition best practice in the United 
Kingdom and the United States is market “pull” for the technology at issue that occurs when 
the technology addresses identified need of a defense acquisition program.  For this reason, 
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the UK CDE does not fund SBRI topical competitions unless the topics are requested by the 
Defense Equipment & Supply organization (even when SBRI topics end up receiving 
additional technology development funding and not acquisition program funding at the 
conclusion of SBRI contract performance).  Likewise, NASA has attempted to fundamentally 
reform its SBIR/STTR programs by ensuring that all its SBIR/STTR topics meet identifiable 
acquisition needs.  In contrast, the DoD has never gone above its 50% topic sponsorship 
policy.  Although there is a need for some SBIR/STTR topics that will further the long-term 
research interests of the DoD (e.g., DARPA topics and topics addressing the needs of 
MILDEP R&D communities), it is clear that the majority of SBIR/STTR topics must have DoD 
acquisition program sponsorship.  Raising the DoD sponsorship policy from 50% of 
SBIR/STTR topics to at least 75% of topics, seeking SBIR/STTR topic recommendations 
from major prime contractors for military departments’ acquisition community sponsorship, 
and requiring a public designator of topic sponsors in the R&D or acquisition communities as 
part of SBIR/STTR solicitations should address any disconnect between the SBIR/STTR 
solicitations and the needs of defense acquisition programs.  It should also provide clearer 
notice to small firms concerning the possibility of any future procurement prospects for their 
technologies. 
3. Confirm the Overall Authority of MILDEP Offices of Small Business 
Programs, Small Business Specialists, and Small Business Technical Advisers 
Over SBIR/STTR Transition Assistance and Incentives 
The study shows that a major part of the DoD SBIR Commercialization Pilot 
Program, as implemented by the military departments, involved contracting for consultants, 
including venture capitalists, to serve as “transition agents” and evaluators of SBIR firms 
seeking Phase III contracts or enhancements to Phase II contracts.  These private advisory 
contractors essentially act as source selection “gatekeepers” for Phase III procurements (for 
example, by pre-selecting candidates presented to Army acquisition program managers for 
Army CPP funding and procurement assistance, thereby making initial eligibility and 
responsibility determinations) or as intermediaries between defense acquisition programs 
and SBIR firms (for example, within the Air Force and the Navy). 
However, the current CPP approach duplicates existing responsibilities of OSD 
agency and MILDEP directors of Offices of Small Business Programs and their small 
business specialist and small business technical advisers embedded in buying commands 
and activities.  The OSBP directors and their small business acquisition workforce oversees, 
and advocates for increase in, small business prime contracting and subcontracting 
participation under the existing legal and regulatory framework, such as 15 U.S.C. § 644(k), 
FAR 19.201, DFARS 219.201, and DFARS PGI 219.201.  The current CPP approach also 
ignores the recommendations of the National Academies of Sciences to support SBIR 
Phase III efforts by using existing incentives for subcontracting with small firms.  The Phase 
III Commercialization Symposium highlighted the experience of the Navy Program Executive 
Office for Submarines (PEO Subs) in utilizing existing subcontracting incentives. 
Therefore, it is recommended that overall authority for CPP activities be conferred in 
the MILDEP and OSD agencies’ Offices of Small Business Programs and that small 
business specialists and technical advisers be funded and encouraged to conduct outreach 
to program managers/program executive offices and prime contractors, engage in SBIR 
technology roadmap development, facilitate inclusion of SBIR/STTR technology transition 
goals into prime contractors’ subcontracting plans, and facilitate testing and evaluation 
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funding assistance to small firms as well as subcontracting incentives for large prime 
contractors. 
4. Realign CPP to Facilitate “Pull” of Technologies Into Defense Acquisition 
Through Secretarial Instructions That Clearly Define Criteria for High Military 
Priority of SBIR Projects as well as CPP Eligibility and Responsibility SBIR 
Firms in Each DoD Agency and MILDEP 
The essence of the CPP structure is to realign the DoD SBIR technology acquisition 
process from a “push” by SBIR firms trying to convince the DoD to purchase their products 
and services to a “pull” of SBIR technologies by DoD acquisition programs (both at the 
government and the prime contractor level).  This realignment is necessary to reverse the 
attitude inside the DoD that SBIR set-asides are a “tax” against mission-focused DoD 
acquisition and RDT&E funds.  The study indicates that CPP eligibility criteria are not well 
defined by the DoD and the MILDEPS.  They appear to be left to the discretion of the CPP 
contractors, including private venture capitalists.  Thus, the focus of evaluation shifts to 
whether an SBIR firm has already developed on its own a profitable government acquisition 
market, not whether the technology is a priority for the Department of Defense or a military 
department and one or more of its acquisition program executive officers or program 
managers. 
Moreover, the current poorly defined CPP eligibility criteria appear to violate the 
Small Business Act ban on excluding small firms from contracts without Certificates of 
Competency.  Under the Small Business Act, government contracting officers are not 
allowed to deny small businesses the awards of any contracts for perceived lack of any 
“elements of responsibility, including, but not limited to capability, competency, capacity, 
credit, integrity, perseverance, and tenacity...without referring the matter for final disposition” 
and a Certificate of Competency to the Small Business Administration.12  Phase III contracts 
to SBIR firms are not excluded from this requirement for a CPP determination.  
Secretarial instructions should clearly provide for (1) Secretarial certifications of high 
military priority for SBIR technologies before such technologies are selected for CPP; and 
(2) a process for evaluation of SBIR firms’ business, financial, and manufacturing 
capabilities that may provide for assessment by business development contractors as well 
as appeal to the SBA for a Certificate of Competency. 
5. Publish Results of Quadrennial Review Concerning SBIR/STTR Topic 
Alignment With DoD R&D Plans and Program Manager/Program Executive 
Officer Inputs 
The study suggests that few SBIR/STTR agencies have conducted the periodic 
Quadrennial SBIR/STTR topics review.  This review has the potential to improve the 
usefulness of SBIR/STTR set-asides and encourage greater Phase III awards by aligning 
SBIR/STTR focus areas with DoD R&D Plans (Defense Technology Area Plan, Basic 
Research Plan, and Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan) as well as acquisition 
programs’ inputs and the DoD Quadrennial Defense Review.   
OSD and MILDEPs should conduct such review and publish its results. 
                                                
12 15 U.S.C. 637(b)(7)(A) (2011). 
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6. Expand CPP to the STTR Program to Enable Access to MILDEP Testing and 
Evaluation Facilities, Including Naval Warfare Centers and DoD Academic 
Institutions, Such as the Naval Postgraduate School 
To the extent that SBIR and STTR technologies suffer from the risk of insufficient 
testing, one major incentive would involve greater access of SBIR and STTR firms to military 
testing facilities and funding for testing and evaluations at these facilities.  Such facilities 
would include the elements of the Naval Warfare Centers Enterprise such as the Naval 
Surface Warfare Center and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, as well as military 
postsecondary academic institutions such as the Naval Postgraduate School, the Air Force 
Institute of Technology, and the military Service academies.   
Specifically, the Small Business Act should be amended to (1) provide for eligibility of 
the military postsecondary academic institutions to participate in the STTR program on the 
same terms as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs); and (2) 
confirm the ability of SBIR and STTR CPP firms to use CPP assistance for testing and 
evaluation activities at military testing and evaluation facilities and military postsecondary 
academic institutions. 
7. Expressly Describe Authorized Acquisition Incentives and Other Types of 
Incentives in CPP Legislation 
It seems clear from the study that the DoD and MILDEP SBIR and STTR managers 
do not fully comprehend the full range of incentives that are authorized under the CPP 
program.  This appears to be due to lack of awareness of the Congressional Guidance 
Letter and the proceedings of the SBIR Phase III Symposium at the National Academies.   
As a result, the DoD and MILDEPs have focused on hiring business advisory and 
assistance contractors to conduct business evaluations, outreach, and advocacy of small 
firms.  Education and business development incentives are only one category of incentives 
among seven possible types of incentives listed in the Congressional Guidance Letter. 
Congress should expressly list all such incentives in amended CPP legislation. 
8. Establish Clear Policies Concerning Technical Assistance Vendors’ 
Investment in SBIR/STTR Firms, Organizational Conflicts of Interest, and 
Performance by Such Vendors of Inherently Governmental Functions 
The current CPP model appears to provide insufficient assurances against 
organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs) and performance of inherently government 
functions (IGF) by government contractors.  Specifically, there is a potential for venture 
capital contractors to recommend for Phase III those SBIR firms that are open to future 
venture capital investments by the recommenders.  There is also a potential for business 
advisory and assistance contractors to recommend only firms that utilize their business 
development assistance services authorized under 15 U.S.C. 638(q), Discretionary 
Technical Assistance, which allows SBIR and STTR agencies to contract with vendors for 
advisory services for individual SBIR and STTR awardees where the awardees will use part 
of their SBIR and STTR awards to pay for such advisory services.   Under FAR 9.505, 
contracting officers must structure acquisitions with the goal of “preventing the existence of 
conflicting roles that might bias a contractor’s judgment...[and] unfair competitive 
advantage.”  Under FAR 9.504, the contracting officer issuing a solicitation (or any 
solicitation-type CPP invitation for future Phase III or Phase II Enhancement awards) must 
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recommend a plan to the head of contracting activity for resolving any significant potential 
conflicts of interest.  Moreover, under the FAR, Congress, the OSD, and the MILDEPs 
should absolutely and unequivocally prohibit contractors that are or may be involved in 
advising or investments to SBIR or STTR firms from participating as advisors on CPP 
evaluation (including any Phase II enhancements or Phase III awards). 
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